

3 May 1968

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposal to Establish IRB and IAC

The proposed Board and Council reflect the desirability of comprehensive, community-wide decision-making on the allocation of intelligence resources. They would replace a decision-making process that is often, for all practical purposes, unilateral and is frequently carried through with little explicit knowledge available as to how the intelligence effort relates to the needs of its users.

The proposed Board would translate the objectives of intelligence, as stated by USIB, into specific programs and resources. It is to be comprised of intelligence producers and would report to the DCI and through him to the proposed Council. The Council would deliberate about all NRP and CCP programs taken together and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for those programs under his jurisdiction.

Several aspects of the Proposal raise questions, particularly with regard to two of the four stated objectives, namely: 1) to ensure greater centralization of decision making on the allocation of resources, and 2) to implement the responsibilities of the DCI and USIB for establishing the objectives and priorities of the national intelligence effort.

- 1) The fundamental substantive problem of comprehensive, centralized decision-making on the allocation of resources is the development of effective criteria and techniques to relate and measure, explicitly, the purposes and resources of intelligence. The associated practical problems are "selling" these criteria and techniques and obtaining the cooperation required to have the necessary data banks. TOD is a good example of success in the latter. Historically, boards have proven more effective as decision-making or recommending bodies than as developmental or "sales" organizations.
- 2) An important part of the substantive problem is establishing the purpose of intelligence -- that is, what the users (who are not members of the intelligence community) want and expect. To accomplish this, the users, or their reasons for wanting intelligence, have to be the ultimate source of objectives and priorities. Past methods, primarily

query, have not proved to be definitive enough for comprehensive and explicit allocation of resources. The proposed Board and USIB are comprised of members of the intelligence community.

- 3) The Council is to recommend the resources to be used by the intelligence community. But the Council is to be made up of users of intelligence, those most able to respond to the other side of the problem: what they, the users, need from intelligence. The intelligence community should be in the best position to recommend how the available resources should be used, providing it adequately knows and hews to its purpose.
- 4) The Board and Council would be limited to the CCP and NRP. This would be a step forward but would still fall short of the better solutions that could be achieved with truly community-wide resource decisions.
- 5) The Secretary of Defense and the Board, which through the Council will advise the Secretary, would

both be advised by DoD staff. Staffs tend to "capture and control" boards and in this case DoD staffs would be influencing the Secretary of Defense through both channels.

NIPE/SAG is presently at the threshold of being able to apply techniques that should contribute to more explicit and objective resolution of resource allocation issues. The establishment of the proposed Board at this time [given the caution that prevails when a change in Administration is only eight months away] is likely to result in further embedment of present methods. Therefore, we suggest as an alternative that establishment of the IRB and IAC be deferred until early in calendar 1969. If this is done, by the time these organizations would be ready to work, we would have had the time to develop operationally applicable decision criteria and techniques for allocating resources; and, equally important, their presentation to the Board would come when the desire to find new ways was at the strongest. Thus, with a little bit of luck, the Board would have tools to make its decisions more effectively and would have a better climate for what we believe are the desired innovation and change. In this way, the Board would be a vehicle for community acceptance of method, for fostering compliance, and to serve the proposed, and perhaps at a later date an expanded, purpose.